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BLOGGING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP †
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM ∗
I. INTRODUCTION: THE WRONG QUESTION
Will blogging somehow transform legal scholarship? That is the wrong
question. The thesis of this essay is that blogging is essentially
epiphenomenal—an effect and not a cause. Blogging is merely a particular
medium—a currently popular form of Web-based publishing. Nonetheless,
the emergence of academic legal blogging is an important indicator of
other trends—real causes that are driving significant transformative
processes. These trends include the emergence of the short form, the
obsolescence of exclusive rights, and the trend toward the
disintermediation of legal scholarship. Those forces and their relationship
to blogging will be the primary focus of this paper.
But first, a word about the relationship of blogging to legal scholarship.
Let me begin with a caveat or two. First caveat: it seems to me obvious
that this relationship is in its early formative stages. The sergeants-at-law
might have thought that the printing press had nothing to do with the
practice of law—after all, law is almost entirely an oral activity, isn’t it?
The late-nineteenth-century legal practitioner might have thought that law
reviews have almost nothing to do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s all
about treatises, isn’t it? The mid-twentieth-century law professor might
have thought that peer-reviewed journals and academic presses have
nothing do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s all about law reviews and
the legal presses, isn’t it? And the early-twenty-first-century scholar might
think that blogs have nothing to do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s
† © 2006 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this paper for scholarly or
teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple copies or post on the Internet for
classroom use and to quote extended passages in scholarly work, subject only to the requirement that
this copyright notice, the title of the article, and the name of the author be prominently included in the
copy or extended excerpt. Permission is hereby granted to use short excerpts (500 words or less) with
an appropriate citation and without inclusion of a copyright notice. In the event of the death or
permanent incapacity of the author, all claims to copyright in the work are relinquished and the work is
dedicated to the public domain in perpetuity.
∗ John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Blog: Legal Theory
Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory. I owe special thanks to Larry Ribstein with whom I have
had many illuminating conversations about blogging. See Larry Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas:
The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=700961.
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all about interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journals, and the academic
presses, isn’t it? To the extent that blogs have anything to do with legal
scholarship, the relationship has just begun to emerge. Undoubtedly it will
change.
A second caveat is important. These remarks about blogging and legal
scholarship are not the product of systematic study or theorizing. Much of
what follows is based on personal impressions and anecdotal evidence. As
a participant observer at the interface between blogging and scholarship, I
have formed a variety of impressions, but many of these are hunches and
speculative hypotheses.
With those caveats in mind, there are, of course, plenty of indicators
that blogs do have “something to do” with legal scholarship. Take, for
example, the survey of citations to legal blogs conducted by Ian Best and
posted on his blog 3L Epiphany. 1
Seventy-five blogs were cited, and the citing publications included the
California Law Review, 2 the Columbia Law Review, 3 the Cornell Law
Review, 4 the Harvard Law Review, 5 the Michigan Law Review, 6 the New
York University Law Review, 7 the Texas Law Review, 8 the University of
Chicago Law Review, 9 the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 10 the

1. 3L Epiphany [now Law Blog Metrics], http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3l_epiphany/files/
law_review_articles_citing_ legal_blogs/index.html (Aug. 16, 2006).
2. Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1476 n.228 (2004) (citing How Appealing, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing).
3. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1160
n.36 (2004) (citing (The Return of) Ignatz, http://sheldman.blogspot.com).
4. W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 76 n.20, 78 n.26 (2005) (citing Balkinization, http://www.balkin.blogspot.com).
5. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance
through Global Governance Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1286 n.48 (2005) (reviewing ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) and citing Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.
blogspot.com).
6. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme
Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1968 n.72 (2005) (citing Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberations, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1022 n.293 (2005) (citing Lessig Blog, www.lessig.org/blog).
8. J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing:
The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83
TEX. L. REV. 525, 530–31 n.33 (2004) (citing Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com).
9. Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1263 n.59 (2004) (reviewing
MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003) and citing Balkinization,
http://www.balkin.blogspot.com).
10. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 86 n.18, 151 n.220, 153 n.223 (2005) (citing Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/).
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Virginia Law Review, 11 and the Yale Law Journal. 12 Best also has a
collection of cases citing blogs, 13 and the list of courts includes the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as numerous federal trial
courts, state supreme courts, and state intermediate courts.
Two stories about my own blog—Legal Theory Blog—are illustrative
of the ways in which blogs can “relate” to legal scholarship. The first story
concerns an eight-part series of posts entitled “Legal Theory Bookclub:
Free Culture by Lawrence Lessig,” 14 At the request of the editors of the
Texas Law Review, these posts were collected, lightly edited, and
published as a sixteen-thousand-word review of Lessig’s book. 15 Whatever
the merits of the posts and the review, they both clearly are “legal
scholarship” by any reasonable definition of that term.
The second story concerns a series of exchanges with Jack Balkin, who
at the time ran Balkinization as a solo blog. In response to a column by
Eddie Lazarus 16 I posted a detailed reply, 17 prompting Jack Balkin to
publish a post entitled “Good Judging and ‘Following the Rules Laid
Down.’” 18 I countered with “A Neoformalist Manifesto,” 19 followed by
Balkin’s “Good Judging and ‘Following the Rules Laid Down,’ Part II.” 20
The exchange ended with my “Fear and Loathing in New Haven.” 21 The
exchange, conducted over the course of four days, runs almost fourteen
thousand words. Without characterizing my own contributions, I believe

11. Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245,
2278 n.161 (2004) (citing ProfessorBainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com).
12. Kevin S. Schwartz, Note, Applying Section 5: Tennessee v. Lane and Judicial Conditions on
the Congressional Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136 n.11 (2005) (citing SCOTUSBlog,
http://www.scotusblog.com).
13. 3L Epiphany, http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3lepiphany /2006/08/cases_citing_le.html (Aug.
6, 2006).
14. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2004_03_01_lsolum_archive.html#
108057665667719921 (Mar. 29, 2004, 10:10 a.m.) (with links to seven additional posts).
15. Lawrence B. Solum, The Future of Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2005).
16. Edward Lazarus, A Recent Dissent by Federal Appellate Judge Alex Kozinski Offers Rare
Candor About the Political Nature of the Judicial Process, FINDLAW, May 15, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030515.html.
17. Legal
Theory
Blog,
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#
200304841 (May 17, 2003, 2:20 p.m.).
18. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_
balkinarchive.html#94523316 (May 18, 2003, 12:21 a.m.).
19. Legal
Theory
Blog,
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#
200307682 (May 18, 2003, 3:00 p.m.).
20. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_balkin_
archive.html #94561782 (May 18, 2003, 11:26 p.m.).
21. Legal
Theory
Blog,
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#
200315303 (May 20, 2003, 11:17 a.m.).
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that it is fair to say that Balkin’s contributions to the exchange were
eloquent, powerful, and intellectually rigorous. Balkin’s side of the
exchange gave me the sense that the possibilities of blogging transcended
the one-paragraph post; Balkin’s blogging blurred the lines between
conventional legal scholarship and bloggership. No one who read the
exchange would be likely to conclude that it had nothing to do with legal
scholarship.
So it is clear that blogging has something to do with legal scholarship,
but in my opinion, that something is really beside a more important point.
The blog or weblog is really just a form of publication on the Internet that
utilizes the World Wide Web and software to reduce the costs of selfpublishing. Everything that can be done on a “blog” can be done using
other tools and formats. Indeed, many “home pages” share most of the
characteristics of blogs. The important set of questions isn’t about the
relationship between blogs and legal scholarship. The important set of
questions concern the fundamental forces that have produced academic
blogging.
In this essay, I shall explore three important trends in legal scholarship:
the transition from the long form to the short form, the transition from
exclusive rights to open access, and the transition from mediation to
disintermediation. This exploration will be organized as follows. Part II
will establish a baseline by sketching the ancien régime—the world of
legal scholarship as it existed before the Internet and as it continues to
exist today. Part III explores the current trends that point in the direction
of new forms of legal scholarship and new practices for its dissemination.
Part IV returns to the topic at hand: the relationship between blogs and
legal scholarship.
II. THE ANCIEN RÉGIME: LONG FORM, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS, AND
INTERMEDIARIES
In order to understand the transformative potential of blogging, we
need to take a look at the world before blogs—the fading landscape of the
long form, exclusive rights, and intermediaries. Legal scholarship’s past is
the world of law reviews and treatises, peer-reviewed journals and
university press books. 22

22. Parts II and III of this essay draw substantially on my Download It While It’s Hot: Open
Access, Intermediaries, and the Dissemination of Legal Scholarship, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
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A. The Long Form and its Long Tail
Law review articles are long. We all know that! But in a certain sense,
the law review article was the “short form” of its era. Before there were
law reviews there were treatises, and the most influential legal scholars
were the treatise writers—the heirs of Blackstone and Chancellor Kent.
The names are still famous: Corbin, Davis, Moore, Nimmer, Wigmore,
Williston, and Wright. The multivolume treatises were and are long.
Really long! Dozens of volumes. Millions of words. Cases in the tens of
thousands.
By comparison, law review articles are short. A mere sixty to onehundred pages was considered a respectable length for a serious piece of
legal scholarship—one that took a doctrinal topic and turned it inside out
and upside down, comprehensively surveying the literature and the
authoritative legal materials. But long-form legal scholarship was not read
much. In part, this was intentional. The treatises were not meant to be read
straight through because they were really encyclopedias, not monographs.
Law review articles were intended to be read straight through, but aside
from a few success stories, it seems likely that even moderately successful
law review articles are read by small (albeit important) communities of
scholars. Even more distressing, it seems likely that some (perhaps many)
law review articles had and have virtually no readers beyond their authors,
editors, and those assigned to evaluate the work if it is relevant to a tenure
decision or lateral hire.
Even though long-form legal scholarship may have very few “top to
bottom” readers, many of these articles have readers of another sort. Fulltext electronic searching has dramatically reduced the costs of locating
relevant passages in long articles that address many topics. When articles
were located via the Index to Legal Periodicals, it surely must have been
the case that many an author published without knowing that two or three
paragraphs in a prior article had already addressed some particular
argument, doctrinal development, or theoretical construct, but Westlaw
and Lexis make the discovery of such passages very inexpensive.
Of course, the many hundreds or thousands of law review articles with
only a few readers each may cumulatively have many readers—the
proverbial “long tail.” 23 And this “long tail” is important—because it
signals the importance of microaudiences and microcommunities of

23. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004, http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/12.10/tail.html.
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scholars. It would be a mistake to believe that a flourishing legal academy
could or should produce only “hits” with broad appeal both in and out of
the academy. Work that reaches only a few in the short run may come to
have a big impact in the long run. Work on narrow topics may nonetheless
make a substantial contribution to knowledge about the law and its
foundations. The long form had and continues to have a long tail.
So the long form is alive and well, but even before the advent of open
access and the Internet, legal academics were moving toward short-form
legal scholarship. Some law reviews began to encourage the submission of
“essays,” essentially short law review articles. 24 Recently, several
prominent law reviews issued a “Joint Statement on Article Length,”
which stated, “The vast majority of law review articles can effectively
convey their arguments within the range of 40–70 law review pages, and
any impression that law reviews only publish or strongly prefer lengthier
articles should be dispelled.” 25 Of course, by the standards of many
disciplines, forty pages of small-type law review pages would be
considered extraordinarily long.
By any standard, legal scholarship is long. Treatises, law review
articles, and even articles in peer-reviewed journals are long, and because
they are long, accessing them is costly.
B. Copyrights: Exclusive and Exclusionary
Long-form legal scholarship is associated with another important
feature—exclusive rights. Copyright law provides exclusive rights to
copyright owners. The most important of these is the right to control
copying—which includes the right to control the making of electronic
copies. Traditional legal scholarship was copyrighted. The publishers of
treatises hold the copyright or exclusive licenses that provide the
equivalent rights of exclusion. The typical law review publication
agreement involved an assignment of copyright from the author to the law
review (or educational institution of which the law journal was a part).
It made perfect sense that treatises were copyrighted and that those
copyrights would be enforced. Treatises were (and are still) published by
for-profit enterprises. The economics of intellectual property required

24. See Yale Law Journal Submissions, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/submissions.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2006) (describing distinction between “articles” and “essays” and stating, “Essays are
usually significantly leaner than Articles: in general, they occupy fewer pages and rely on less
voluminous citation.”).
25. See Joint Statement on Article Length, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/joint_statement.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
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copyright, because exclusive rights create the incentives to invest in the
creation and dissemination of new works. The theory is that without
copyright, the treatises would have been “ripped off” by some
entrepreneurial outfit that would have had lower production costs because
it would not have had to pay either Wigmore or Little Brown’s editorial
staff.
Copyright made less sense in the world of law review articles. Very
few law review article copyrights have any economic value. I have never
had an offer from anyone to buy the copyright in one of my articles. Have
you? I can’t imagine that I would find any takers if I were offer to sell at
any nontrivial price. There are some indicators that law review articles
have an economic value. Law reviews do charge for subscriptions, but it
seems unlikely that copyrights are necessary to protect that income stream.
For one thing, law reviews operate with free labor and subsidized direct
costs. It’s not clear that a for-profit enterprise—which would have to pay
for labor and the costs of capital—could compete. Or to put the same
points somewhat differently: law schools (and not law review readers) pay
legal academics to produce legal scholarship.
Copyright is problematic for another reason. Exclusive and
exclusionary rights in law review articles create access and dissemination
problems. A famous example is Lon Fuller’s famous article, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 26 published in the
Harvard Law Review in 1958. Fuller retained the copyright, but after his
death, obtaining permission to use the article in course packets and
anthologies became impossible—the orphan work problem. 27
Legal academics want to be read, but exclusive rights are barriers to
readership. Even if permission is freely granted, seeking it is costly. If
identification of the rights’ holder is difficult, then the transaction costs are
likely to pose an insurmountable barrier. It is not clear the copyrights
increase the supply of legal scholarship and it does seem clear that they
reduce the demand for it.
There are signs that the model of exclusive rights is beginning to give
way. Many student-edited law reviews have begun to permit open access. I
now insist on open access as a condition of publication, and my experience
is that most law reviews are willing to modify their publication agreements

26. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630 (1958).
27. The facts related in text are based on personal experience. So far as I know, no published
source documents the status of Fuller’s estate.
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to permit open access. Many law reviews now routinely post open-access
versions of the articles they publish on their Web sites.
But peer-reviewed journals are different. Most peer-reviewed journals
are published by academic or for-profit presses that view the content of
these journals as their intellectual property and as a potential source of
revenue. Increasingly, peer-reviewed journals are available in electronic
form, via JSTOR or other closed, proprietary electronic databases, but
access to these databases is expensive. Very expensive. Just ask a
librarian. Individual articles may be available for download in exchange
for payment of a one-time fee, but these fees may be cost-prohibitive.
Thirty dollars for a single copy of a single article is a typical fee.
So I will not publish in any peer-reviewed journal without open access.
And that means that for all practical purposes, I will not publish in most
peer-reviewed journals. They are dinosaurs. Magnificent beasts, to be sure.
But they will evolve or become extinct.
C. Intermediaries: Source and Search
The ancien régime of legal publication stood on three legs—the long
form, exclusive rights, and intermediation—the institutions and
individuals that controlled access to legal scholarship. Let’s take a hard
look at the intermediaries. One way to slice the intermediation pie is to
distinguish between “source intermediaries” (publishers) and “search
intermediaries” (indexers). Both were important. First, let’s take a look at
source intermediaries.
1. Source Intermediaries
Source intermediaries are individuals and institutions that stand
between authors and audiences. For reasons both historical and economic,
the form of intermediation varied depending on whether the mode of
publication was serial or monograph.
a. The Law Reviews and Peer-Reviewed Journals
With respect to serials, let’s distinguish between law reviews and peerreviewed journals. Law reviews were (and are) edited by law students—an
arrangement that was (and is) unique in the academy and the source of
much consternation. The reasons for the consternation are obvious and
familiar. Second- and third-year law students are not experienced legal
scholars. They are likely to reject important new scholarship when they
fail to comprehend its significance. They are likely to accept bad
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scholarship that “sounds impressive” or addresses a “hot topic.” Because
students are not well acquainted with the literature, they are likely to favor
scholarship that rehearses old arguments before adding a new point. Of
course, law students aren’t stupid. They are likely to understand their own
limitations, and that creates another problem. If student editors cannot
trust their own judgment, then they are likely to rely on “proxy variables,”
such as the institutional affiliations of authors or their prior record of
publication. 28 This means that important new scholars at obscure
institutions can have a terribly difficult time “breaking in” to the prestige
law reviews. And, even worse, it means that established scholars with a
“track record” can coast—publishing unimportant, derivative, and
unoriginal scholarship in the most prestigious venues for years and years.
The law reviews have been increasingly supplanted by peer-reviewed
journals—although it is important not to overstate what is still a small
exception to the general rule. The upside of peer-reviewed journals is
sophisticated judgment. Experienced academics are better equipped to
separate the wheat from the chaff.
Despite their advantages, peer-reviewed journals come with a set of
problems. Unlike law review editors, peer editors are embedded in social
networks of professional affiliation. Although some editors meet the very
highest standards of personal integrity and critical self-awareness,
enabling them to transcend almost all bias, most academics suffer from the
usual human foibles. They favor the theories and research of their friends
and are harshly critical of the views of their professional enemies. Some
editors favor work of young scholars who are the former students of the
powerful and ignore those who have studied with the unpopular or the
obscure. Review that is “blind” in theory may involve “taking a peek” in
practice.
Intermediation can create delays. In this regard, student-edited journals
have a significant advantage over peer-reviewed journals. Student-edited
journals permit multiple simultaneous submissions. This creates
competition between journals to make rapid decisions about the most
sought-after articles. (I have had an article accepted within six hours of
submission, and I am sure that is nowhere near the record.) But peerreviewed journals generally require exclusive submissions—in order to
reduce the burden on readers, who are themselves prominent and busy
academics. Student-edited journals can make decisions in days or even

28. See generally Leah M. Christensen & Julie A. Oseid, Navigating the Law Review Article
Selection Process: An Empirical Study of Those With All the Power—Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV.
465 (forthcoming 2008).
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hours. Peer-reviewed journals take weeks or months. When combined with
exclusive submission, this means that the publication of an important
article can be delayed for years. And if you have been around the business
in fields where peer-reviewed journals provide the only outlets, you know
about articles—really fine ones—that simply sit in a drawer after two or
three rejections (and getting to the drawer may have involved two or three
years of waiting for rejection letters).
b. Legal and Academic Presses
Intermediation takes a slightly different form in the case of
monographs. Until recently, most academic legal monographs were
published by for-profit legal publishers. The for-profit legal publishers
aimed solidly at their most important and profitable market—practicing
lawyers. That was all well and good in the era of doctrinal scholarship. But
once interdisciplinarity took hold of the legal academy, the for-profit,
practitioner-oriented publishers simply did not provide an outlet,
prestigious or otherwise, for the kinds of books that sophisticated legal
academics wanted to write. That was because these books were not aimed
at practitioners. They were aimed at other legal academics.
Enter academic legal monographs and the academic presses. Of course,
there were law books by academic presses even in the heyday of the
treatise. But it seems clear that the legal academy today is more focused on
the academic press than it was two or three decades ago. The goal of the
ambitious law professor is to publish a 300-page monograph with a
prestigious academic press; it is most assuredly not publication of a
multivolume treatise.
There is an irony here. The academic press monograph provides a
substitute for the long-form law review article. What one would once have
published as a 150-page law review article, one now publishes as a 300page book from a university press. There are certainly advantages to the
monograph form. Monographs can be a bit longer, and university presses
encourage writing that can reach a multidisciplinary audience.
The trend to substitute monographs for long law review articles has not
been cost free. Whatever was formerly the case, most university presses
must now “float on their own bottom.” That is, they are expected to turn a
profit or at least break even. Whereas the law reviews published short
monographs as articles without regard to the bottom line, the academic
presses cannot afford this luxury. Obscure areas of law without
interdisciplinary appeal are poor candidates for book contracts. At least
one prestigious press has recently discontinued its law and philosophy
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series—too few sales. And the bottom-line orientation of university
presses makes open access difficult, if not impossible.
2. Search Intermediaries
The old world involved a second form of intermediation—the role
played by what I call “search intermediaries.” Once again, the status quo
consists of a mix between a vanishing set of old-fashioned tools (card
catalogs and indexes) and the now familiar high-tech tools for searching
and manipulating electronic texts.
a. Card Catalogs and the Index to Legal Periodicals
Card catalogs no longer consist of three-by-five cards. They have been
replaced by electronic databases. Like card catalogs, the databases
facilitate subject-matter-based searches with the Library of Congress
classification scheme providing the primary organizational system. It is
not clear whether many legal scholars use electronic card catalogs as a
research tool. To speak from my own experience, I make very occasional
use of electronic catalogs. The typical situation involves my having
identified a monograph published by a traditional for-profit legal
publisher. Because those books are usually quite expensive, I am more
likely to borrow them from a library than I am to buy a copy from
Amazon.com. I am not sure that I have used an electronic card catalog for
the primary purpose of doing research for more than a decade—although I
have sometimes found myself using the research capacity of a card catalog
when I first accessed it for another purpose.
Another old-fashioned search intermediary is the Index to Legal
Periodicals. Again, I am not sure there is any data about usage patterns,
but in my own case, I no longer use the Index to Legal Periodicals for any
purpose and have not used it for more than a decade. My guess is that I
would now find the Index (and similar indexes) to be a very crude tool
when compared to full-text searching.
b. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis
Functionally, indexes and card catalogs have been replaced by closed
electronic text databases. There were (and are) two in the United States—
Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis. These databases store vast quantities of legal
text—cases, statutes, regulations, law review articles, and treatises. The
data permits the generation of what is called a concordance, which
correlates words with locations. The existence of a concordance permits
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Boolean searching. For example, I can search for the word “Coase”
immediately preceding the word “theorem” and get all instances of the
phrase “Coase theorem” in a given database. The logical operators
“AND,” “OR,” and “NOT” are permitted, as are proximity variables, such
as “Coase” within two words of “theorem.” Boolean searches are
powerful.
But the world of Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis is not nirvana because these
databases are proprietary and closed. They are proprietary—access to the
search engines is expensive. They are closed—the databases are not
searchable by Internet search engines such as Google. That means that
only a tiny fraction of the global population of academics and students has
meaningful access to these systems. Of course, the fraction that does have
access is important—it includes most of the legal academics in the North
Atlantic and Commonwealth democracies. But the group of excluded
scholars is enormous. Even in the United States, many institutions without
law schools ration access to Westlaw and Lexis. Outside of Europe and
North America, access is severely restricted.
III. THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE SHORT FORM, OPEN
ACCESS, AND DISINTERMEDIATION
So what will the future look like? Prediction is always perilous, but I
will go out on a limb. The future, arriving as you read these words, will
emphasize the short form over the long, open access over proprietary
rights, and disintermediation over traditional intermediaries. The future
will be short and free with very little between the author and the reader.
A. Short Form
Legal scholarship today is moving toward the short form. What will the
short form look like? I think the best strategy is to briefly canvass the
possibilities:
• The idea paper—Idea papers have actually been around for a
long time. In the early stages of a project, you have “the idea”—
the central thesis that will be the part of the article that is
actually new and moves the literature forward. So you write a
very short paper—perhaps twenty double-spaced pages—that
sets out the idea. In the old days, the idea paper might be
presented at a “brown bag” or “early stage workshop.” But these
days, the idea paper can be thrown up on the Social Science
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Research Network (SSRN). And that has important
consequences. It allows the author to “stake out” the idea—to
establish “ownership” for the purpose of determining “who came
up with it first.” And SSRN allows wide circulation. And
because short papers are short, they may attract readers who
would find the long-form version to be too costly to assimilate.
• The blog post—Blogs are a very flexible vehicle for publication.
Although some blog posts are very short—a sentence or
paragraph—nothing precludes blog posts that range from a few
hundred to a few thousand words—long enough to develop a
significant new idea or argument. One example of an innovative
use of the blog form is University of Chicago law professor
Randy Picker’s Picker MobBlog, 29 which produces online
symposia about various topics and articles. SCOTUS blog 30 has
done some very interesting things by inviting scholars and
practitioners to produce an online discussion about new Supreme
Court cases on the day they are handed down. 31
• The Wikipedia article—Wikipedia itself is a collaborative, opensource, open-access encyclopedia. 32 The technology underlying
Wikipedia is the wiki—an engine that permits collaborative
authorship on the Web. Another model for an online
collaborative encyclopedia is the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. The Stanford project is closed—you must be invited
to write an article—but it does provide something close to
“open” access to content of an extremely high quality. One can
imagine some hybrid emerging as a substitute for the traditional
treatise. Dozens of scholars might collaborate on an online wikidriven Contracts treatise, with all the advantages of massive,
parallel editing and input.
By providing a list, I do not mean to predict the future of the short
form. Just a few years ago, I didn’t even know that blogs and wikis
existed. Moreover, wikis and blogs are engines—they are the platforms

29. Picker MobBlog, http://picker.typepad.com/.
30. SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/.
31. See Posting of Sam Bagenstos to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/2005/06/05-week/ (June 6, 2005, 9:20 p.m.). This is the first of a series of posts on Gonzales
v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1 (2005).
32. Wikilaw, http://wiki-law.org/mwiki/index.php?title= Main_Page, has not had much impact as
of the date of this writing.
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that allow for innovation in the development of the short form. It may be
that these platforms have already created the space in which the “normal”
version of short form legal scholarship will emerge. It may be that new
platforms will open up possibilities for the short form that we cannot yet
see.
B. Open Access
The old world was exclusive rights. The new world is open access.
Open access is important because it reduces the cost of legal scholarship to
readers. In the old world, you had to go to the library, get the volume of
the law review off the shelf, and make a photocopy. That was costly. If
you were a law professor, some of these costs might be subsidized. You
might be able to shift the costs from your research budget to the library. Or
you could have a research assistant do the fetching and copying. But it was
costly enough that you did not want to have to do it twice, and we all
accumulated photocopies by the hundreds, neatly organized in files or
piled up in huge disorganized stacks. If you were not a law professor, the
costs were considerably higher, and every law student from a certain era
will remember taking copious notes and copying out passages by hand.
Very costly.
Open access means doing an online search and then downloading the
article. When you’re done, you might save it on your hard drive or you
might just delete it because you can always find it and download it again
in a matter of minutes or even seconds. There is a digital divide, and not
everyone has high-speed Internet access, but most academics and students
do, almost universally in the most developed world and selectively
elsewhere. Wherever there is high-speed Internet, open access
dramatically reduces the cost of accessing and using legal scholarship.
As a practical matter, the most common form of “open access” in the
legal academy (in the United States, and increasingly among scholars who
write in English throughout the world) is created by the posting of Articles
on SSRN. But, of course, posting on SSRN is not true and full open
access. Articles posted on SSRN are available on the Internet and can be
downloaded, but unless the article itself grants further permissions, the
downloaded version cannot be recopied or reposted. SSRN abstracts can
be crawled, but SSRN does not currently permit full-text searching. And
this final point is quite important. Because SSRN does not permit full-text
searching, it falls short of the full promise of open access. Which brings
me directly to my next topic.
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C. Disintermediation
The disintermediation of legal publication is a very recent
development. Just a few years ago, almost all legal scholarship was
published after screening by an intermediary, for example, a student
editorial board, a peer editorial board, or the editors of an academic or
legal press. Disintermediation involves replacing these intermediary
institutions with “thin intermediaries” or no intermediary at all. The most
familiar example of a thin intermediary is SSRN. SSRN mimics the form
of the peer-reviewed journals—but with thin rather than thick review. You
cannot just post anything to SSRN. It is “peer-reviewed.” But SSRN does
not have space constraints. So the threshold for “acceptance” is low. You
cannot post your recipe collection or a rant about people who use cell
phones in public places on SSRN. But you probably can post an article
that advances a fairly kooky legal theory. (Of course, you could probably
have gotten it published in a law review as well.) SSRN circulates (by email) abstracting journals, organized by subject matter and institution.
These perform a mediating function, but there is no pretense of selecting
only the “best” pieces. Everything written by serious academics will be
abstracted in the appropriate journal.
SSRN involves thin intermediation, but the Internet creates
opportunities for total disintermediation. Legal academics do not need
SSRN to make their work available on the World Wide Web. Almost
every college or university provides facilities for the creation of a personal
home page and server space that can host downloadable papers and
articles. The linked paper then becomes accessible to Web crawlers, which
then can provide the full text to the database of a search engine such as
Google. In some ways, this solution is superior to SSRN because SSRN
does not facilitate full-text searching. But SSRN has advantages as well.
Even though it is absurdly easy to create your own web page and upload
articles, many law professors do not have a clue as to how these simple
tasks can be accomplished. SSRN provides an institutional framework for
posting on the Web, and many law schools provide administrative support
for those who find SSRN’s simple interface to be daunting.
The importance of Web-based publication is dramatically enhanced by
the search engine. There are many search engines, but Google dominates
that business and provides a convenient focus for discussion. Google is not
a perfect search engine. It does not produce a concordance of the Internet
and therefore it cannot provide the full range of Boolean searches offered
by Westlaw and Lexis. Google provides only two Boolean operators
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(“AND” and “OR”), and Google does not permit proximity searching
(such as a search of the form “blog” within five words of “constitutional”).
Despite Google’s limitations, Google is one of the driving forces for
the disintermediation of legal scholarship. Google itself is accessible to
anyone who has access to the Internet. Google is very easy to use. Google
is fast. Google is free. The combination of Google with open access is
incredibly powerful because it allows for a “direct connection” between
authors and readers. I put the phrase “direct connection” in scare quotes,
because, of course, Google itself is an intermediary. Google doesn’t
present links in random order. It rank orders search results, and the precise
method for producing the rank order is a trade secret. But Google’s
success depends on the value delivered by the rank ordering. Google
wants to get the most relevant and useful results to the top of the rank
ordering. Indeed, Google offers users the option of searching with the “I’m
Feeling Lucky” option that will take the user directly to the number one
link in the rank ordering.
If you are old-fashioned like me, it may bother you that we are about to
enter an era when all research will be done on Google or the rival that
beats Google to the development of the next great search technology.
Well, not all research, of course. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis are not going
away tomorrow. PhD candidates, students writing their law review notes,
and young associates at big firms will all be required to do exhaustive
searches using multiple techniques. But undergraduates, ordinary folks,
and even professionals are increasingly becoming reliant on Google as the
primary (and perhaps the only) method for doing ordinary, down-and-dirty
research.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF BLOGGING
Having surveyed the past of legal scholarship and speculated about its
future, we can return to the questions with which we began: Do blogs have
something to do with legal scholarship? Could blogs tranform legal
scholarship in some way? I have argued for the proposition that blogs are
symptoms of the larger forces at work in the world of legal scholarship.
The importance of blogs, if any, is as the medium (or technology) through
which the incentives and institutional forces that are pushing legal
scholarship toward the short form, open access, and disintermediation are
doing their work. If it had not been blogs, it would have been something
else. If someone invents a medium that provides a more effective or less
costly mechanism through which the forces can operate, then blogs will
recede and that medium will take their place. It’s not about the blogging.
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And when I say it’s not about the blogging, I also mean that
alternatives to blogs are already on the scene. We already have Wikipedia
and the “wiki,” the technology that drives open access, open authorship,
and massively collaborative scholarship. 33 Less radical are the closed
authorship online encyclopedias—the Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 34 or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 35 Online paper
repositories like SSRN and the Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) are
already significant forces in the dissemination of legal scholarship.
So if blogs will play a role in the transformation of legal scholarship, it
will be a modest one. It seems to me that blogs can function in two ways
that contribute to the emergence of the new order of short-form, openaccess, disintermediated legal scholarship. First, blogs themselves can
serve as the medium by which short-form scholarship is written and
disseminated. That is, blog posts can be legal scholarship. If anyone ever
thought otherwise, they simply were not paying attention. Blogs can be
legal scholarship because anything that can be written can be written as a
blog post. Blogs lend themselves to very short pieces—but blog posts of
over one thousand words are not uncommon and even longer pieces can be
broken into several posts. Second, blogs can serve to introduce and
disseminate legal scholarship. In this regard, the interaction between
SSRN and the blogosphere is instructive. On Legal Theory Blog, I
mention or discuss several hundred SSRN papers every year. Other blogs
interact with SSRN in similar ways. A similar point can be made about the
blogosphere and other forms of legal scholarship. For example, the “Legal
Theory Calendar” is a feature of Legal Theory Blog. The calendar
publicizes talks, workshops, and conferences that may be of interest to
academics who work in legal theory. Because many workshop,
colloquium, and conference Web sites have a Web page that includes links
to the papers that will be presented, blogs can link both to the event and to
the downloadable paper—once again creating a new channel for the
dissemination of legal scholarship. Moreover, each individual legal
scholar can create her own blog—which can serve as vehicle for the
promotion of the scholar’s own work.
One might think that blogs are replacing or supplementing the
traditional intermediaries. There is something to that thought. I am not

33. See Wikipedia, Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000) available at, http://encyclo.findlaw.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
35. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zaita, Spring 2006 ed.), http://plato.
stanford.edu/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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arguing that the old intermediaries will disappear. Blogs serve as an
alternative channel of information about legal scholarship—an alternative
form of “peer review” that is more competitive, open, and transparent than
the traditional peer review processes. Blogs are more competitive for
obvious reasons. Peer-reviewed journals are expensive to produce and
their boards of editors are self-perpetuating; although some fields have
many competing peer-reviewed journals, the editorial boards frequently
interlock. By contrast, the entry barriers to starting a blog are low, and
each new blogger is free to compete for readers. Blogs are more open and
transparent—except for anonymous blogs—because their assessments of
legal scholarship are available to the whole world via the Internet. By
contrast, most peer-reviewed journals keep the identity of reviewers secret
and reveal only which articles were accepted. The reasons for acceptance
and rejection (but not the identity of the reviewers) are usually
communicated to the author (or rejected aspirant), but are rarely disclosed
to others. Of course, competition and transparency can cut in multiple
directions. Some bloggers may compete for readers by emphasizing the
accessible and eschewing complex ideas that are difficult to understand.
Some bloggers may respond to transparency by self-censorship—blogging
only when they have “something nice” to say. But precisely because
blogging is transparent, such behaviors are likely to be noticed by readers.
Blogs, like journals, acquire reputations that affect readership and the
ways that readers use the information they glean from blogs.
Prediction is perilous, and I have no special knowledge of the future of
legal scholarship. But I do have an opinion: we are moving in the direction
of open access to disintermediated short-form legal scholarship. I am
much less confident about the specific forms and institutions the future
will take. But I do have an opinion: blogs will play only a modest
supporting role in the future of legal scholarship. Scholarship is about
“papers,” not “posts.”

